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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-1072 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD UNDERHILL, 
 
                                      Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-08-cr-00177-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 5, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and SÁNCHEZ,*
 
 District Judge. 
(Filed: January 6, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
*The Honorable Juan R. Sánchez, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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 Richard Underhill pled guilty to mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and 
the District Court sentenced him to four years’ probation, with the first six months to be 
served in a community confinement center and the next six months to be served in home 
detention.  On appeal, Underhill challenges the District Court’s calculation of the amount 
of loss attributable to his fraudulent conduct, as well as the reasonableness of his 
sentence.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of the case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Underhill owned AARCO Real Estate, a real estate company that purchased and 
developed land.  In 2002, Underhill was in the process of creating a housing 
development, Birch Ridge Village, in Washington County, Pennsylvania (the 
“Development”).  Underhill purchased the land, but did not have sufficient credit to 
obtain a construction loan necessary for development of the land.  To obtain the necessary 
funds, Underhill prepared and submitted a credit loan application using the name of one 
of his employees, Anthony Jacob.  In so doing, he grossly overstated Jacob’s income and 
assets and misstated Jacob’s employer.  Underhill knew that the information he included 
in the loan application was false at the time the application was prepared. 
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 Based on the false information, Home Builders Finance approved the loan.  
Accordingly, on July 30, 2002, Jacob signed a loan agreement in the amount of $152,500 
for the construction of a new home to be built on Lot 8 of the Development.  The loan 
was collateralized by the land, as well as the home to be constructed on Lot 8. 
 Shortly after obtaining the loan, Underhill learned that Lot 8 was zoned for 
commercial use.  Therefore, Underhill used the money to construct a home on Lot 2, 
while continuously representing to Home Builders Finance that the house was being 
constructed on Lot 8.  After Home Builders Finance disbursed the entire $152,500 loan, 
Underhill was unable to make any payments on the loan and defaulted.  At that point, 
Home Builders Finance discovered that no construction had taken place on Lot 8, where 
it held the mortgage. 
 Home Builders Finance instituted a civil suit against Underhill, Jacob, and several 
companies controlled by Underhill, seeking to recover the entire amount of the $152,500 
loan, as well as accrued interest and costs.  Home Builders Finance asserted various 
claims, including fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of 
contract, and racketeering.  The civil suit settled.  Underhill agreed to pay $200,000 to 
Home Builders Finance in order to resolve all outstanding debt on the construction loan.  
In exchange, Home Builders Finance agreed to return the deed to Lot 8 of the 
Development. 
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 Following the civil suit, Underhill was indicted and charged with one count of mail 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  He pled guilty.  The Presentence Investigation 
Report (“PSR”) calculated the amount of loss at $117,600, which represented the amount 
of the fraudulent loan ($152,500) reduced by the value of the land that was pledged as 
collateral for the loan ($34,900)1
 Underhill made several objections to the PSR.  First, he claimed that the loss 
amount was zero, rather than $117,600, because the lender did not suffer any actual loss.  
Specifically, he argued that the amount of the fraudulent loan ($152,000) should be 
reduced by the amount he paid pursuant to the settlement agreement ($200,000).  Second, 
he requested a departure or variance because the amount of loss allegedly over-
represented the seriousness of the offense.  Third, he requested a variance based on his 
history and characteristics. 
.  Accordingly, the PSR designated Underhill’s offense 
level at thirteen, consisting of a base offense level of seven, an eight-level enhancement 
for an amount of loss of $117,600, and a two-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility.  Underhill was placed in a criminal history category of I, yielding a 
guideline range of twelve to eighteen months of imprisonment. 
 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court heard arguments regarding the proper 
calculation of the amount of loss.  Ultimately, the District Court adopted the PSR’s loss 
                                                 
 1 The value of the land pledged as collateral for the loan was determined to be 
$34,900, the price at which a comparable neighboring lot was sold to an unrelated party in 
2003. 
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figure of $117,600 and applied the corresponding eight-level enhancement.  In so doing, 
the District Court found that there was no basis to conclude that the $200,000 settlement 
was paid entirely as disposition of collateral.  Instead, the majority of the payment 
represented voluntary restitution on Underhill’s part.  The District Court, however, 
granted downward variances based on Underhill’s history, characteristics, and the fact 
that the offense level substantially overstated the seriousness of Underhill’s offense.  
Accordingly, Underhill was sentenced at criminal history I and offense level ten, which 
yielded a guideline range of six to twelve months of imprisonment.  The District Court 
sentenced Underhill to a four-year term of probation, with the first six months to be 
served in a community confinement center, and the next six months to be served in home 
detention.  Underhill timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  We review the District 
Court’s factual findings, such as the amount of loss, for clear error.  United States v. 
Jiminez, 513 F.3d 62, 85 (3d Cir. 2008).  However, we review de novo the methodology 
that the District Court used to calculate loss under the Guidelines.  Id. at 85-86.  We apply 
an abuse-of-discretion standard and review a sentence for reasonableness, which requires 
that the sentence be both procedurally sound and substantively reasonable.  United States 
v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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III. 
 Underhill raises two issues on appeal.  First, he contends that the District Court 
erred in applying an eight-level enhancement based on its calculation of loss.  Second, he 
alleges that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  We will 
address each contention in turn. 
A. 
 For offenses involving fraud, the Guidelines provide for an enhancement based on 
the amount of loss that resulted from the fraud.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.(b)(1).  The offense level 
is increased by eight where the amount of loss is between $70,000 and $120,000.  
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(E)-(F).  In calculating actual loss, note 3(E)(ii) to Section 2B1.1 
of the Guidelines provides: 
 In a case involving collateral pledged or otherwise provided by the 
defendant, [loss shall be reduced by] the amount the victim has recovered at 
the time of sentencing from disposition of the collateral, or if the collateral 
has not been disposed of by that time, the fair market value of the collateral 
at the time of sentencing. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(E)(ii).2
 Underhill argues that the District Court erroneously failed to consider the $200,000 
settlement in its calculation of actual loss.  Specifically, Underhill argues that the 
“disposition of the collateral” occurred when the deed was transferred pursuant to the 
 
                                                 
 2 The rule of lenity only applies where “there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty 
in the statute.”  United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 270 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis in 
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settlement agreement, at which point Underhill simultaneously paid $200,000 to the 
victim.  Therefore, Underhill maintains that Home Builders Finance experienced a “zero 
loss” fraud.  This argument fails. 
 In calculating the total amount of loss, the District Court looked to “the amount of 
money the victim ha[d] actually lost (estimated at the time of sentencing).”  United States 
v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 536 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc).  The Guidelines provide two 
circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to receive credit to reduce the amount 
of loss.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(E).  First, a sentencing court must subtract from the 
initial loss calculation any funds that were returned to the victim “before the offense was 
detected.”  Id.  Here, Underhill paid $200,000 only after the offense was detected, and 
therefore cannot receive credit on this basis.  Second, a defendant is entitled to credit for 
the amount of loss received by the victim upon disposition of the collateral.  In other 
words, the loss is reduced by the pledged assets because those assets are always available 
for recovery.  See United States v. Austin, 479 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 The District Court properly determined that the $200,000 settlement amount did 
not represent the value of collateral because the undeveloped land was not worth 
$200,000.  Instead, Underhill made the $200,000 settlement payment not solely “for the 
disposition of the collateral,” but also as partial voluntary restitution.  He was therefore 
not entitled to the full $200,000 setoff.  Accordingly, the District Court determined that 
                                                                                                                                                             
original) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998)).  It is 
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the proper setoff was the value of the property, which it found to be approximately 
$34,900.  Moreover, “[a] defendant in a fraud case should not be able to reduce the 
amount of loss for sentencing purposes by offering to make restitution after being 
caught.”  United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 204 (3d Cir. 1994).  We hold that the 
District Court properly calculated loss under the Guidelines. 
 Underhill next challenges the District Court’s factual finding regarding the fair 
market value of the collateral.  The District Court “is in a unique position to assess the 
evidence” and “need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, 
cmt. n.3(C).  Accordingly, we must defer to the District Court’s loss determination unless 
it is clearly erroneous.  Id.; see also Jiminez, 513 F.3d at 85.  The District Court 
determined that a reasonable estimate of the fair market value was $34,900, the amount at 
which a comparable neighboring lot was sold to an unrelated party in 2003.  This is not 
clearly erroneous, and we accept the District Court’s finding. 
B. 
 We review a district court’s judgment of sentence under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard for reasonableness.  United States v. Tomko, 560 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(en banc).  We first ensure that the District Court committed no significant procedural 
errors in arriving at its decision.  Wise, 515 F.3d at 217.  Procedurally, a “sentencing court 
is required to give ‘rational and meaningful consideration’ to the relevant § 3553(a) 
                                                                                                                                                             
therefore inapplicable here because the meaning of the Guidelines is clear. 
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factors.”  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).  Substantively, the “final sentence, 
wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, [must be] premised upon 
appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.”  Doe, 617 F.3d at 770 
(quoting United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)).  The record 
reflects that the District Court gave “meaningful consideration” to the relevant sentencing 
factors and weighed those factors against any mitigating considerations.  Doe, 617 F.3d at 
769.  Accordingly, we conclude that Underhill’s sentence was both procedurally and 
substantively reasonable. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
sentence. 
